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The essay claims to distinguish coherence from consensus but ultimately replaces ontological grounding with a metaphysical assertion—God—without ever arguing for God’s existence as part of mind-independent reality. This is textbook reification: coherence dressed up as metaphysics.

You rightly identify the dangers of consensus—groupthink, volatility—and correctly define coherence as internal and external consistency. But you then collapse coherence into theological necessity by positing God as the external referent coherence “requires.” That’s the error: taking an abstract structure (coherence) and retrofitting it with a referent (God) without first proving that referent exists.

But coherence must point to what’s self-evident, not imagined. My referents—existence, identity, consciousness—aren’t argued for; they’re the precondition of all argument. “God” isn’t.

It’s as if you’re saying: “Coherence requires an external anchor. Therefore, that anchor is God. Therefore, God is real.” This is pure question-begging. But the axioms are what make questions possible.

You describe coherence as an epistemological process, but treat its conclusion—God—as an ontological given. You’re using the structure of thought to smuggle in a claim about being, without ever demonstrating that the “being” in question is more than a conceptual placeholder.

Even if reason requires a grounding point, you can’t just insert “God” into that role. Ontological reality isn’t established by conceptual need or logical elegance. The referent must be discovered, not posited. Existence is self-evident and demonstrable; “God” is neither. Physical constants like the speed of light are not assumed—they’re measured. God, here, is not discovered but declared.

The essay casts God as the only escape from epistemic circularity, invoking Gödel as support. But Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems apply to formal systems, not metaphysical reality. Every system is by definition part of reality.

Plus, the very need of theologians to define gives the game away: we define what we already conceptually identify as real—not the other way around. A child conceptually identifies a dog long before he can define dog. Theology inverts this process, exposing itself as psychological projection rather than metaphysical identification.

Plus, you present God as a logical rather than theological necessity—which only magnifies the error.

You appeal to cultural consequences—as if moral or political disarray somehow proves God’s existence. But social outcomes are not metaphysical evidence. That’s emotive reasoning masquerading as philosophical insight.

You never define what you mean by “God.” Is it a personal deity? A Platonic form? The classical necessary being? A metaphysical constant? The ambiguity allows you to claim universality while avoiding ontological commitment. It’s a semantic smokescreen—designed to simulate profundity while dodging definitional rigor.

Saying “God was always meant to be the constant” treats historical utility as metaphysical proof. But how a culture uses an idea tells us nothing about whether that idea corresponds to reality. India uses the idea of Karma to organize its society. Does that make Karma ontologically real?

Ironically, this is the very consensus-dependence you claim to reject.

Why is it that no one treats existence or our awareness of its identity as a mere opinion? Because existence is directly perceived—axiomatically known. But God is never perceived this way. He must be argued for. You reverse this: you treat the perceptually self-evident as conditional and ideas as necessary. That’s epistemic inversion.

Once again, what you’ve written is a rhetorical performance, not a philosophical argument. It borrows the language of coherence to obscure its unargued center. Were you held to the same standard of proof you demand of others, your position would collapse—because coherence without grounding is just storytelling, and grounding without referent is faith, not knowledge.

This is why you avoid the axiomatic method. Because if you agreed to start at the foundation—existence, consciousness, identity—your reification, equivocation, and special pleading would become blindingly obvious. The line between metaphysical reality and mentation would be clear.

—James

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